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Abstract
Cognition in living entities – and their social groupings or institu-
tional artifacts – is necessarily as complicated as their embedding envi-
ronments, which, for humans, includes a particularly rich cultural milieu.
The asymptotic limit theorems of information and control theories permit
construction of a new class of empirical ‘regression-like’ statistical mod-
els for cognitive developmental processes, their dynamics, and modes of
dysfunction. Such models may, as have their simpler analogs, prove use-
ful in the study and remediation of cognitive failure at and across the
scales and levels of organization that constitute and drive the phenomena
of life. These new models particularly focus on the roles of sociocultural
environment and stress, in a large sense, as both trigger for the failure of
the regulation of biocognition and as ‘riverbanks’ determining the chan-
nels of pathology, with implications across life-course developmental tra-
jectories. We examine the effects of an embedding cultural milieu and
its socioeconomic implementations using the ‘lenses’ of metabolic opti-
mization, control system theory, and an extension of symmetry-breaking
appropriate to information systems. A central implication is that most, if
not all, human developmental disorders are fundamentally culture-bound
syndromes. This has deep implications for both individual treatment and
public health policy.
Key Words: cognition; culture; developmental trajectory; global broad-
cast; living state; statistical models
1 Introduction
Contrary to much of current Western medical ideology, both the underlying
structure and external manifestations of mental disorder are heavily influenced,
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if not substantially determined, by culture. In essence, mental dysfunctions
reflect a famous aphorism by the evolutionary anthropologist Robert Boyd:
‘Culture is as much a part of human biology as the enamel on our teeth’. We
argue here that other ‘developmental disorders’, via the central role of cognition
at every scale and level of organization, will also be heavily influenced by the
embedding cultural milieu.
Following Kohrt et al. (2014), something of this has been partly recognized
within the current revision of the US-based Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which refers to ‘Cultural Concepts of Distress’
as ways that cultural groups experience, understand, and communicate suffer-
ing, behavioral problems or troubling thoughts or emotions (APA 2013; Lewis-
Fernandez et al., 2017). But beyond that, cultural differences in schizophrenia
outcomes, identified in three successive studies (Craig et al. 1997; Harrison et
al. 2001; Sartorius et al. 1972, 1977; WHO 1981; Jablonsky et al. 1992) have, in
the words of Kohrt et al., “...done little to alter conceptualizations or treatment
of the disorder...”.
Here, we will offer such an altered conceptualization, using new statistical
models of cognitive processes based on the asymptotic limit theorems of infor-
mation and control theories.
Kleinman and Good (1985, p. 492) outline something of the cross-cultural
subtleties affecting the study of depression that argue against simple evolution-
ary or genetic interpretations. They find that, when culture is treated as a
constant, as is common when studies are conducted in Western society, it is
relatively easy to view depression as a biological disorder, triggered by social
stressors in the presence of ineffective support, and reflected in a set of symp-
toms or complaints that map back onto the biological substrate of the disorder.
However, when culture is treated as a significant variable, for example, when
the researcher seriously confronts the world of meaning and experience of mem-
bers of non-Western societies, many Western assumptions about the nature of
emotions and illness are cast in sharp relief.
Dramatic differences are found across cultures in the social organization,
personal experience, and consequences of such emotions as sadness, grief, and
anger, of behaviors such as withdrawal or aggression, and of psychological char-
acteristics such as passivity and helplessness or the resort to altered states of
consciousness. They are organized differently as psychological realities, com-
municated in a wide range of idioms, related to quite varied local contexts of
power relations, and are interpreted, evaluated, and responded to as fundamen-
tally different meaningful realities. Depressive illness and dysphoria are thus not
only interpreted differently in non-Western societies and across cultures; they
are constituted as fundamentally different forms of social reality.
A number of comprehensive overviews support that perspective, for exam-
ple, Bebbington (1993), Jenkins et al. (1990), Manson (1995). It is now clear
that cultural variations exist in the areas of meaning, perceived causes, onset
patterns, epidemiology, symptom expression, course, and outcome, variations
having important implications for understanding clinical activities including
conceptualization, assessment, and therapy.
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Kleinman and Cohen (1997) argue that several myths have become central
to Western psychiatry. The first is that the forms of mental illness everywhere
display similar degrees of prevalence. The second is an excessive adherence to
a principle known as the pathogenic/pathoplastic dichotomy, which holds that
biology is responsible for the underlying structure of a malaise, whereas cultural
beliefs shape the specific ways in which a person experiences it. The third myth
maintains that various unusual culture-specific disorders whose biological bases
are uncertain occur only in exotic places outside the West. In an effort to base
psychiatry in ‘hard’ science and thus raise its status to that of other medical
disciplines, psychiatrists have narrowly focused on the biological underpinnings
of mental disorders while discounting the importance of such ‘soft’ variables as
culture and socioeconomic status.
Some further examination of mental disorders will prove useful, and we follow
something of (Wallace 2015a).
The criteria for a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) in the
US medical nosology Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM III-R 1987, pp. 344-346) lists a set of chronic disruptive, irresponsible
and antisocial behaviors, including lack of remorse and empathy, and so on
(e.g., Hare et al. 1991). Kessler et al. (1994), in a study of the USA, observed a
prevalence of about 3.5% of ASPD. Later work found similar prevalence (Grant
et al. 2004; Compton et al. 2005). In stark contrast, Hwu et al. (1989), using
DSM III instruments translated into Chinese, found for Taiwan prevalences of
0.03, 0.07, and 0.14%, respectively in village, small town, and Taipei settings,
rates that are markedly lower than in the USA.
Weissman et al. (1994) used DSM III criteria to quantify obsessive com-
pulsive disorder (OCD) across a number of international settings. While the
lifetime rates for Western societies were found to be approximately 2.3%, in
Taiwan, the observed rate was 0.7%. As they comment,
...[T]he lifetime... and... annual prevalence rates (cases per 100)
of obsessive compulsive disorder in seven international communities
were remarkably consistent (with the exception of Taiwan)... The
prevalence rates for Taiwan were substantially lower than all of the
other sites, paralleling Taiwan’s low published rates for all psychi-
atric disorders.
South Korea, in the aftermath of attempts at deculturation carried out dur-
ing the Japanese occupation between 1910 and 1945, followed by the Korean
War, was found to suffer an OCD rate of 1.9% in that study, still lower than
the USA at 2.3%.
These results suggest a meditation on the differences between East Asian
and Western modes of thinking. The cultural psychologist S. Heine (2001)
argues that the extreme nature of American individualism implies that a psy-
chology based on late 20th century American research not only stands the risk
of developing models that are particular to that culture, but of developing an
understanding of the self that is peculiar in the context of the world’s cultures.
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Indeed, Western atomistic thinking, which pervades a spectrum of disciplines
ranging from economics and evolutionary theory to psychology and psychiatry,
has deep cultural roots (Wallace 2015b, Ch. 1).
In contrast, Nisbett et al. (2001), following in a long line of research (Markus
and Kitayama 1991; Heine 2001), review an extensive literature on empirical
studies of basic cognitive differences between individuals raised in East Asian
and Western cultural heritages, which they characterize, respectively, as ‘holis-
tic’ and ‘analytic’, finding that
1. Social organization directs attention to some aspects of the perceptual
field at the expense of others.
2. What is attended to influences metaphysics.
3. Metaphysics guides tacit epistemology, that is, beliefs about the nature
of the world and causality.
4. Epistemology dictates the development and application of some cognitive
processes at the expense of others.
5. Social organization can directly affect the plausibility of metaphysical
assumptions, such as whether causality should be regarded as residing in the
field vs. in the object.
6. Social organization and social practice can directly influence the develop-
ment and use of cognitive processes such as dialectical vs. logical ones.
Nisbett et al. (2001) thus conclude that tools of thought embody a culture’s
intellectual history, that tools have theories built into them, and that users
accept these theories, albeit unknowingly, when they use these tools.
Matsuda and Nisbett (2006) find that, whereas East Asians view the world
holistically, attending to the entire field and relations among objects, West-
erners view the world analytically, focusing on the attributes of salient objects.
Compared to Americans, East Asians were more sensitive to contextual changes
than to focal object changes, These results suggest that there can be cultural
variation in what may seem to be basic perceptual processes.
Similarly, Nisbett and Miyamoto (2005) argue that fundamental perceptual
processes are influenced by culture. These findings establish a dynamic rela-
tionship between the cultural context and perceptual processes. They suggest
that perception can no longer be regarded as consisting of processes that are
universal across all people at all times.
Wallace (2007) explores analogous dynamics involving inattentional blind-
ness and culture.
Here, we will assert that the embedding influence of culture can generalize
across cognitive physiological subsystems in humans. Indeed, it is well known
that schizophrenia, for example, is parallel to significant medical comorbidities
such as hypertension, diabetes, and inflammation, leading to reduced lifespan by
a variety of mechanisms (e.g., Silverstein et al. 2017). The syndrome has been
associated with systemic mitochondrial dysfunction (e.g., Ben-Shachar 2002,
Prabakaran et al. 2004; Shao et al. 2008; Scaglia 2010; Clay et al. 2011).
Similarly, mitochondrial dysfunction has also been found in autism spectrum
disorder (e.g., Palmieri and Persico 2010; Giulivi et al. 2010; Rossignol and Frye
2014; Goh et al. 2014). We shall make much of such observations in Section 3
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below, introducing explicit mechanisms for the impact of social interaction and
cultural milieu.
Indeed, the living state, it has been argued, must be cognitive at almost
every scale and level of organization. As Maturana and Varela (1980) put it,
A cognitive system is a system whose organization defines a do-
main of interactions in which it can act with relevance to the mainte-
nance of itself, and the process of cognition is the actual (inductive)
acting or behaving in this domain. Living systems are cognitive sys-
tems, and living as a process is a process of cognition. This statement
is valid for all organisms, with and without a nervous system.
The argument is consistent with the perspective of Atlan and Cohen (1998),
who characterize the immune system as cognitive using an information theory
approach. The underlying inference is that, from basic biochemical mechanism,
through gene expression and development, multicellularity, clonal/social struc-
ture, to the elaborate institutions of human populations, living systems must
receive ‘environmental’ signals (in a large sense), compare them with a learned
or inherited ‘picture of the world’, and then choose a small set of actual re-
sponses from a larger range of those available to them. Such choice reduces
uncertainty in a formal manner, and such reduction implies the existence of an
information source ‘dual’ to the cognitive process. Wallace (2005, 2012, 2015a,
b, 2017, 2018) provides particular mathematical instantiations.
The Baars model of consciousness (1988) introduces another essential mecha-
nism that appears to generalize across physiological subsystems (Wallace 2012),
i.e., that a set of underlying ‘unconscious cognitive modules’ must come together
to create a rapid, shifting, highly tunable coalition that responds in a local ‘real
time’ to the dynamic challenges facing an organism. Baars’ time frame for con-
sciousness is of the order of 100ms. Clearly, similar mechanisms must operate
at and across other time domains, scales and levels of organization for other
adaptive coalitions of cooperating ‘lower level’ cognitive modules.
Cognition, coalition, and tunability must all be highly regulated to function
reliably in the context of the changing demands of the rapidly-shifting ‘roadway’
topologies confronting living systems. These will act at and across various scales
and levels of organization that may be within or outside the organism. It is
the nature of such regulation and its failure that is the focus of this work,
using currently-available theoretical tools adapted from information and control
theories, most centrally involving the linkages between the two. We will be
particularly concerned with constructing statistical and other models of the
effects of toxic exposure and ‘psychosocial’ stress (or its equivalent) on patterns
of cognitive failure at and across the various scales and levels of organization
(Wallace 2012).
We will adapt some results from information and control theories to explore
necessary conditions for stability in cognitive processes at and across different
scales and levels of physiological organization, with a particular emphasis on the
potential role of embedding cultural information sources. Similar approaches are
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already appearing in the literature (e.g., Silverstein et al. 2017) and promise
considerable advance.
We begin with some fairly general remarks on the relation between informa-
tion and control in the context of ‘global broadcast’ models, and then, moving
beyond the idea of ‘culturally-specific generalized inflammation’ used in Wal-
lace (2015b, Section 8.5), introduce three new parallel ‘lenses’ as provided by
optimization theory applied to metabolic free energy, by examination of the
failure of a control system under sociocultural environment and stress, and by
an analog to symmetry-breaking that is appropriate to information processes in
a cultural milieu.
For completeness, we attach a summary of the ‘generalized inflammation’
argument in the Appendix.
An implication of this work is that deeper understanding of cognition and
its pathologies requires new formal tools, perhaps different from, but certainly
no less sophisticated than, those now used at the far ends of theoretical physics.
At the not inconsiderable price of learning such tools, we will more deeply culti-
vate the stunningly rich landscapes of evolutionary, biological, and sociocultural
process. Many will find the challenges and opportunities energizing.
2 Basic formalism
2.1 The Data Rate Theorem
To reiterate, biological systems and subsystems must function on complex,
rapidly-shifting real-time ‘roadway’ topologies and are inherently unstable pre-
cisely because of those embedding topologies. The canonical metaphor is of
driving a fast car on a twisting, pot-holed road at night. This requires not
only quick reflexes and a reliable vehicle, but really good headlights. All impor-
tant physiological processes are inherently unstable in the control theory sense:
development must be closely regulated to activate and deactivate a relatively
small number of genes in exactly the right sequence and at the right stage, in
concert with and response to powerful, often rapidly-changing, epigenetic and
environmental signals.
Failure of control – onset of instability – produces serious developmental
disorders. The cognitive immune function (Atlan and Cohen 1998) engages
in pathogen attack and routine maintenance according to highly irregular pat-
terns of need, but must be closely regulated to avoid autoimmune dysfunction.
Similarly, the stream of animal consciousness must be held within contextual
‘riverbanks’ to restrict its meanderings to useful realms. Inattentional blindness
can lead to individual predation, while group survival among social animals
requires conformance to group norms.
Thus for important biological and social processes, instability and its draco-
nian regulation are always implicit.
The Data Rate Theorem (DRT) (Nair et al. 2007) links control and infor-
mation theories in the study of regulation and its failure for such systems. To
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use the metaphor, the DRT tells how good the headlights must be for driving
on a given twisting, pot-holed road at night. In detail, the Data Rate Theorem
establishes the minimum rate at which externally-supplied control information
must be provided for an inherently unstable system to maintain stability.
For simplicity, we assume a linear expansion near a nonequilibrium steady
state (nss), i.e., a condition that requires constant inflow of free energy for
maintenance. An nss may be inherently stable or unstable, at a given energy
flow, but depends on that constant flow for continued existence.
Thus an n-dimensional vector of parameters at time t, say xt, determines
the state at time t+ 1 according to the relation
xt+1 = Axt +But +Wt (1)
A,B are fixed n × n matrices, ut is the vector of control information, and
Wt is an n-dimensional vector of white noise. See Figure 1.
Following Nair et al. (2007, Theorem 1), the DRT states that the minimum
rate of control information H necessary to stabilize the system is
H > log[|det[A]|] ≡ a0 (2)
The right hand side of Eq.(2) is interpreted as the rate at which the under-
lying system generates ‘topological information’.
According to the DRT, stability will be lost if the inequality of Eq.(2) is
violated. For the night driving metaphor, if the headlights go out, a twisting
road cannot be navigated. Here we will examine in more detail the dynamics of
control failure under constraints of both available information and the ability
to implement regulatory action. A more comprehensive derivation of the DRT
is given in Wallace (2017, Section 7.10), based on an application of the Rate
Distortion Theorem that varies with the control channel, but is based on the
necessary convexity of the Rate Distortion Function for all channels.
2.2 No free lunch
Many, if not all, algorithmic systems – particularly those cognitive in the At-
lan/Cohen sense – are constrained by the famous ‘no free lunch’ theorem (NFLT)
(e.g., Wallace 2017, Section 4.11; Wolpert and MacReady 1995, 1997). An algo-
rithmic approach to real-time problems usually centers on optimization of some
chosen objective value function: total income, loss, cost by some measure, and
so on. The NFLT argues there is no generally superior function optimizer.
That is, according to the theorem, an optimizer ‘pays’ for superior perfor-
mance on some functions with inferior performance everywhere else. For those
systems where the theorem applies, gains and losses balance and all optimizers
have identical average performance: superiority on one subset of functions, by
and large, implies inferiority on the complementary subset. This implies the
necessity of tuning in the face of dynamic challenge, i.e., of the existence of a
higher executive, or hierarchy of them, able to sense when to ‘change gears’ in
a shifting ‘roadway’ environment. Thus Baars’ model – a shifting ‘spotlight’ of
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Figure 1: A linear expansion near a nonequilibrium steady state of an inherently
unstable control system, for which xt+1 = Axt + But + Wt. A,B are square
matrices, xt the vector of system parameters at time t, ut the control vector
at time t, and Wt a white noise vector. The Data Rate Theorem states that
the minimum rate at which control information must be provided for system
stability is H > log[|det[A|]. This is characterized as saying that the rate of
control information must exceed the rate at which the unstable system generates
topological information.
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cooperating lower level cognitive modules – emerges as a necessary evolutionary
response to a critical ‘resource limitation’.
A parallel approach follows the arguments of Wallace (2017, Section 4.10):
it is straightforward to invert the famous Shannon Coding Theorem, fixing the
distribution of the message sent along some channel, but tuning the probability
distribution of that channel so as to maximize the information transmitted at
the fixed message distribution. In a sense, the message is interpreted as ‘trans-
mitting the channel’, and, according to the Shannon Coding Theorem, there will
then be a channel distribution that will maximize such a dual channel capacity.
Channel maximization for one set of control signals is thus highly specific to the
message transmitted, and must be retuned for a different message.
Shannon (1959), in fact, described something of this in terms of a duality
between the properties of an information source with a distortion measure and
those of a channel, particularly for channels in which there is a cost associated
with the different ‘letters’ transmitted. Solving the problem, Shannon claims, is
equivalent to finding a source that is right for the channel and the desired cost.
In a dual way, evaluating the rate distortion function for a source corresponds
to finding a channel that is just right for the source and the allowed distortion
level.
The implication is that, under dynamic circumstances, there must be a
higher executive, an overriding cognitive system, able to retune the underly-
ing control system of Figure 1 according to shifting demands, i.e., a dynamic
‘optimizer of optimizers’.
2.3 Global broadcast
Such an optimizer of optimizers emerges via the evolutionary exaptation of the
inevitable crosstalk between the information sources dual to the ‘lower level’
cognitive processes of interest (Wallace 2012). The simplest model is of a net-
work of information sources whose probability of interaction is measured by the
strength of the crosstalk. For a random network, it is well known that a ‘gi-
ant component’ involving most of the network nodes emerges in a punctuated
manner once the strength of interaction exceeds a well-defined threshold. By
contrast, a linked stars-of-stars configuration has a zero threshold: everything
is connected. Network topology counts.
A random network analysis assumes a variable average number of fixed-
strength linkages between the information sources composing the network nodes.
Mutual information, by contrast, can continuously vary in magnitude, suggest-
ing the need for a parameterized renormalization. The modular network struc-
ture linked by crosstalk has a topology depending on the degree of interaction.
The central argument, following Wallace (2012) closely, is as follows. Define
an interaction parameter, say ω, a real positive number, and look at geomet-
ric structures defined by linkages set to zero if crosstalk mutual information is
less than that value, and set to unity if greater than ω. A given ω will define
a regime of giant components of network elements – cognitive submodules –
linked by mutual information greater than or equal to it.
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The argument can be inverted. Some given topology for the giant com-
ponent will define a critical value ωC such that network elements interacting
by crosstalk mutual information less than this value will be unable to partic-
ipate, that is, will be locked out and not ‘consciously’ perceived on the time
scale of the shifting ‘spotlight’ global broadcast of interest. As a result, ωC
is a tunable, syntactically dependent, detection limit that depends on the in-
stantaneous topology of the corresponding shifting, tunable, giant component
of linked cognitive modules defining the dynamic global broadcasts required by
the no-free-lunch constraints. Wallace (2012) shows how this argument can be
extended to a multiple set of simultaneous global broadcasts, characterized by
a vector Ω = (ω1, ..., ωm).
All global broadcast systems, because of their necessary dynamic flexibility,
are inherently unstable in the control theory sense and require fairly draconian
regulation, as constrained by the Data Rate Theorem. What is the metabolic
cost of such regulation?
3 Through the lens of metabolic optimization
Heinrich et al. (1991) describe enzymatic reaction systems using optimization
principles. Their introductory remarks are relevant as well to cognitive systems:
...[A]ny approach towards the explanation of... the structural
design of metabolic systems must take into account the fact that
these systems are, in contrast to chemical systems of inanimate na-
ture, the outcomes of evolution... In many... studies evolution is
considered as an optimization process. This view is supported by a
number of observations, for example by the fact that mutations or
other changes... lead in most cases to a worse functioning of cellular
metabolism... Much theoretical work has been devoted to inquire
whether the structural design and functioning of present-day bio-
chemical systems can be rationalized on the basis of optimization
principles... In quantitative investigations the crucial point is the
formulation of appropriate performance functions whose maximum
(or minimum) value might correspond to the outcome of... evolu-
tion...
Wallace (2016) adapts an Arrhenius chemical reaction rate relation to model
the rate at which biological cognition can proceed, treating the rate at which
metabolic free energy is delivered to the system of interest as a temperature
analog. For comparison, at 300 K, molecular energies are about 2.5 kJ/mol.
By contrast, the hydrolysis of ATP at 300K represents about 50 kJ/mol, an
effective ‘temperature’ of 6000 K.
The Rate Distortion Function R of the cognitive channel of interest is a
‘free energy’ index leading to a Boltzmann-like probability argument that a
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normalized, dimensionless, rate of cognition, as measured by R will be given as
P [R ≥ R0] =
∫∞
R0
exp[−R/κM ]dR∫∞
0
exp[−R/κM ]dR = exp[−R0/κM ] (3)
where M is the rate at which metabolic free energy is supplied, κ is a local
constant and R0 is the threshold channel capacity necessary for initiation of a
cognitive function. In real systems this value will never be zero, and in many
global broadcast settings will involve sharp punctuation much like the onset of
consciousness: on or off.
The efficiency of a cognitive function indexed by j can thus be measured as
fj(Mj) =
exp[−Kj/Mj ]
Mj
(4)
for an associated local parameter Kj .
More generally, some j = 1, ..., n cognitive modules must work together
within an organism. They must communicate with each other, reflected at each
module by some ‘bandwidth’ Cj representing the channel capacity available
to the module. In addition, the embedding environment, represented by an
information source H, must impose signals on each module at some rate Hj .
For humans, there will be an additional embedding cultural signal module. Then
Eq.(4) becomes
fj(Mj , Cj , Hj) =
exp[− KjMjCjHj ]
MjCjHj
(5)
Across the organism there will be significant constraints,
M =
n∑
j=1
Mj , C =
n∑
j=1
Cj , H =
n∑
j=1
Hj (6)
Note that we will assume n cognitive modules and m constraints.
Given a particular cognitive module and its embedding regulatory apparatus
– which must also be cognitive – we can now make a linear scalarization of a
multi-objective optimization problem using unit weighting (Hwang and Massud
1979), and examine a standard Lagrangian optimization problem using
L =
n∑
j=1
fj(Π
m
k=1x
j
k)−
m∑
k=1
λk(Xk −
n∑
j
xjk)
∂L/∂xjk = λk (7)
where the x are variates, the X their limiting sums, and the λ are dual ‘cost
variates’ often treated as ‘undetermined multipliers’. In Eqs.(5) and (6), m = 3.
We can use algebraic regularities to project down, in a sense, on a single
variate, here the rate of available metabolic free energy provided by mitochon-
drial and related machineries. This is somewhat subtle. Examining the set of
11
relations determining a stationary point, the second half of Eq.(7), and then
eliminating the full derivative of f , by virtue of the product of independent
variates, leads to conditions of the form xjpλq = x
j
qλp. Upon summation, a
projection symmetry emerges as
xjp =
Xp
Xq
xjq (8)
Then
fi(Π
m
j=1x
i
j) = fi(
[xiq]
m
Xm−1q
Πp 6=qXp) (9)
For p 6= q we now normalize to Xp ≡ 1, and examine a module and its
regulatory apparatus, taking each as having the same threshold K in Eq.(5).
We obtain the relation
f(Mi) =
exp[− Ki
M3
i
/M2
]
M3i /M
2
(10)
and begin by examining a particular module and its regulatory system under
metabolic free energy constraints. That is, we look at
exp[− K1
M31 /M
2 ]
M31 /M
2
+
exp[− K2(M−M1)3/M2 ]
(M −M1)3/M2 (11)
which would be appropriate to animal models, i.e., in the absence of culture,
but taking social interaction as part of the environment.
Thus M = M1 + M2 is the constrained rate of metabolic free energy avail-
able to the cognitive system and its (similarly cognitive) associated regulatory
apparatus.
Figure 2 shows Eq.(11) for K1 = K2 = 0.5, over the range 0 ≤M ≤ 5.
Below a threshold rate for the supply of metabolic free energy, the efficiency
measure has a pathological bifurcation, a separation into two disjoint ‘legs’.
Above that threshold rate, the efficiency measure greatest when metabolic free
energy is supplied equally to the system and its regulator, since we have taken
the threshold levels K1 = K2 in this example.
The second condition of Eq.(7) is of independent interest, i.e., ∂L/∂Mi = 0
so that ∂f/∂Mi = λ. This is because, in a physical model, λ can be interpreted
as an inverse temperature (e.g., Schrodinger 1989, Ch.II). Taking the derivative
of Eq.(10) gives
∂f/∂Mi = 3
M2
(
KM2 −Mi3
)
Mi
7 e
−KM2
Mi
3 = λ (12)
Figure 3 shows this relation for M1, M2 = (M −M1) and K = 0.5 from
Figure 2, at M = 5. Of particular note is the fact that the derivatives are
equal at M1 = M2 = M/2 and that the value of λ is negative. In a physical
system, a negative temperature represents an unstable ‘pumped’ state in which
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Figure 2: Below a threshold rate for the supply of metabolic free energy, the ef-
ficiency measure has a pathological separation into two disjoint sections. Above
the threshold, efficiency is greatest when metabolic energy is supplied equally to
the system and its regulator, since, here, the threshold K values are the same.
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raising the energy causes the entropy to decline. For these models λ may be an
independent system parameter. As Jin et al. (2008) note, if the circumstances
surrounding λ are sufficiently pathological, no optimal state may exist.
Stochastic versions of this model are possible. The most straightforward
is to average Eq.(7) across some of the variates and carry out the resulting
optimization on the averaged expression. Here we focus on distributions in the
threshold parameter K from the Arrhenius model.
Averaging Eq.(10) over Kj produces blunted versions of Figures 2 and 3
for inverted-U distributions that have modes greater than zero, or are indeed
censored at zero.
Of more interest are inverse-J distributions for which the mode is zero, re-
gardless of the mean value. Taking K in Eq.(10) as having an exponential
distribution, so that dP (K) = ω exp[−ωK]dK, ω > 0, gives the surprising
result
< fi >=
M2
< Ki > M2 +M3i
(13)
The graph using this expression that corresponds to Figure 2 – recalling that
we are optimizing the sum f(< K >,M1) + f(< K >,M −M1) – is shown in
Figure 4, and is similar for other reverse-J distributions in K, i.e., with zero
mode.
An HPA axis might well be conditioned to have a higher probability of
activation at low thresholds under pathologies of posttraumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). The co-occurrence of depression with PTSD might then be seen as
a protective measure designed to raise threshold activation to more tolerable
levels, with the added costs of depressive symptoms (e.g., Dekel et al. 2014,
2017; Oquendo et al. 2003).
Similarly, Figure 4 might represent a schizophrenic inability to sort signals
that is driven toward the more normal form of Figure 2 by the onset of the
‘negative symptoms’ that blunt emotional expression and the ability to engage
in social exchange. Silverstein et al. (2017, pp.88-89) postulate something
similar in terms of an increased level of noise in schizophrenic neural processing,
represented here by the reverse-J distribution in activation threshold.
This argument involves a third-order metabolic free energy model that in-
corporates only one level of impinging ‘environmental’ information, basically
an animal model. The human version, according to our arguments, would be
a fourth order model, i.e., Eq.(10)-(12) would be in terms of M3i , M
4, so that
Figures 2-4 would be considerably sharpened. For humans, small changes in
the rate of metabolic free energy may then have far greater consequences than
in animal models, a consequence of having ‘culture as much a part of human
biology as the enamel on our teeth’.
We next examine the failure of regulation from a specifically control theory
perspective, particularly in the context of environmental contamination and/or,
for higher organisms, psychosocial stress.
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Figure 3: The condition ∂f/∂Mi = λ at M = 5, K = 0.5, in Figure 2. The
derivatives are equal at Mi = M/2, but a negative λ implies this is a potentially
unstable ‘excited state’ of the system. If, however, the system parameter λ is
sufficiently positive or sufficiently negative, no optimal value will exist. The
gray graph represents ∂f/∂M1 and the black ∂f/∂M2, remembering that M2 =
M −M1.
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Figure 4: Optimization surface for an exponential distribution in activation
threshold, K. Using Eq.(13), we examine f(< K >,M1) + f(< K >,M −M1).
While inverted-U distributions for K reproduce blunted versions of Figure 2,
other reverse-J distributions – having a zero mode – reproduce this result.
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4 Through the lens of control theory
4.1 Extending the Data Rate Theorem
How do elaborate control systems generally fail in other contexts? The military
strategist and historian Carl von Clausewitz emphasized two factors leading to
control failure in ‘simple’ systems: ‘fog-of-war’ and ‘friction’. These are, first,
the inevitability of limited intelligence regarding battlefield conditions, and, sec-
ond, the difficulty of actually imposing control. For the night-driving metaphor,
this might perhaps be a synergism between poor headlights and unresponsive
steering. It is possible to generalize this insight to more complicated circum-
stances, at the expense of some further mathematical overhead.
Biological real-time cognitive systems can be expected to have several, per-
haps many, constraints acting synergistically. We must thus envision, for each
such, a relatively large nonsymmetric n×n-matrix analog to a ‘correlation ma-
trix’, a matrix ρ having elements ρi,j representing those constraints and their
pattern of interaction. Such matrices each have n invariants, ri, i = 1, ..., n,
that remain fixed when ‘principal component’ transformations are applied to
data, and we can construct an invariant scalar measure from them, based on
the standard polynomial relation
p(β) = det(ρ− βI) = βn + r1βn−1 + ...rn−1β + rn (14)
det is the determinant, β a parameter, and I is the n×n identity matrix. The
first invariant will be the trace of the matrix, and the last ± the determinant.
Using these n invariants it is possible to then define an appropriate composite
scalar index Γ = Γ(r1, ..., rn) as a monotonic increasing real function. This is
essentially the Rate Distortion Manifold of Glazebrook and Wallace (2009) and
the Generalized Retina of Wallace and Wallace (2016).
Using the one-dimensional projection Γ, we heuristically extend the condi-
tion of Eq.(2) as
H(Γ) > f(Γ)a0 (15)
The Mathematical Appendix, following Wallace (2017, Section 7.10), applies
a Black-Scholes approximation to find that H(Γ) will have, in first order, the
surprisingly simple form H ≈ κ1Γ + κ2. Taking f(Γ) to similar order, so that
f(Γ) = κ3Γ + κ4, the limit condition becomes
T ≡ κ1Γ + κ2
κ3Γ + κ4
> a0 (16)
where we characterize T as the ‘control temperature’ of the system. For Γ = 0
the stability condition is κ2/κ4 > a0. At large Γ this becomes κ1/κ3 > a0. If
κ2/κ4  κ1/κ3, the stability condition may be violated at sufficiently high Γ.
Figure 5 shows the pattern.
How does T change in time?
The central point is how the control signal ut in Figure 1 is expressed in the
system response xt+1, with a focus on T .
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Figure 5: The horizontal line represents the critical limit a0. For κ2/κ4 
κ1/κ3, at an intermediate value of the index Γ the ‘control temperature’ T falls
below that limit, and control fails.
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The basic idea is to deterministically retranslate an observed sequence of
system outputs Xi = xi1, x
i
2, ... into a sequence of possible control signals Uˆ
i =
uˆi0, uˆ
i
1, ... and compare that sequence with the original control sequence U
i =
ui0, u
i
1, ..., with the difference between them having a particular value under some
chosen distortion measure and hence having an average distortion (Cover and
Thomas 2006)
D ≡
∑
i
p(U i)d(U i, Uˆ i) (17)
where p(U i) is the probability of the sequence U i and d(U i, Uˆ i) measures the
distortion between U i and the sequence of control signals that has been deter-
ministically reconstructed from the system output.
According to the Rate Distortion Theorem, there is a Rate Distortion Func-
tion (RDF), R(D), that determines the minimum channel capacity necessary to
keep the average distortion below a fixed real limit D > 0 in the presence of
noise (Cover and Thomas 2006). Based on Feynman’s (2000) interpretation of
information as a form of free energy, using the system’s channel-specific Rate
Distortion Function R, we next construct a Boltzmann-like probability in the
control temperature T as
dP (R, T ) = exp[−R/T ]dR∫∞
0
exp[−R/T ]dR (18)
since higher T must necessarily be associated with greater channel capacity.
The denominator can now be interpreted as a statistical mechanical parti-
tion function, and it becomes possible to define a ‘free energy’ Morse Function
(Pettini 2007; see the Mathematical Appendix) F as
exp[−F/T ] ≡
∫ ∞
0
exp[−R/T ]dR = T (19)
We can now define an ‘entropy’ in the free energy measure F as the Legendre
Transform S ≡ F(T )− T dF/dT = T . This allows use of a stochastic Onsager
approximation for the dynamics of T in the gradient dS/dT (de Groot and
Mazur 1984). The resulting stochastic differential equation is
dTt = µdt+ σTtdWt (20)
where µ is a ‘diffusion coefficient’ representing the attempts of the system to
meet the demands of control, dWt is Brownian white noise, and σ determines
the magnitude of the volatility.
The base equation
dT /dt = µ > 0 (21)
‘explodes’ with increasing time. By the Stochastic Stabilization Theorem (Mao
2007; Appleby et al. 2008), an ‘exploding’ function |f(x, t)| → ∞ for which
|f(x, t)| ≤ |x|ω, ω > 0 (22)
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can be stabilized by a volatility term σxtdWt in the sense that
lim sup
t→∞
log[|x(t)|]
t
→ −σ
2
2
+ ω (23)
almost surely. If σ2/2 > ω, x(t)→ 0.
Thus, for fixed µ, rising ‘volatility’ – increasing σ – can trigger a downward
ratchet leading to violation of the DRT condition for T in a highly punctuated
manner.
A variant of this model assumes a volatility expression of the form
σ
√
T 2 + β2dWt, β > 0
in Eq.(20), so that there is an internal source of variation, β, independent of
T . Then expansion of log[T ] via the Ito relation, using Jensen’s inequality for
a concave function, leads to the expectation condition
E(T ) ≥ E(log[T ]) = µ±
√
µ2 − β2σ4
σ2
(24)
Some exploration shows the upper limit is stable, while the lower either
rises to the upper or collapses to zero. An evident necessary condition for any
stability is µ > βσ2, independent of, and in addition to, the DRT stability
requirement that T > a0.
4.2 A first stress model
We now extend the analysis to include the effects of sociocultural influence and
environmental stress, via introduction of an inverse index – φ – into Eq.(20),
making the replacement T → φT . More generally, any positive, monotoni-
cally increasing function of φ and T could be used, at the expense of algebraic
complications. Their simple product serves as a first example.
Adapting the model from the Appendix of Wallace (2018), the entropy ex-
pression then becomes
S = F(T , φ)− T ∂F/∂T − φ∂F/∂φ =
φT (log[φT ] + 2) (25)
Taking φ as a fixed external index, the dynamic relation becomes
dTt = (µ∂S/∂T )dt+ σTtdWt =
(µφ(log[φTt] + 3)dt+ σTtdWt (26)
Expanding log[Tt] using the Ito Chain Rule gives
dT /dt = µφ log[T (t)φ] + 2µφ− 1
2
T (t)σ2 (27)
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There are, again, two nonequilibrium steady state solutions. Again, these
are very roughly constrained by Jensen’s inequality, with the larger one stable
and the smaller either collapsing to zero or increasing toward the larger. The
relations are
E(TL) ≥ − 1
σ2
2φW [−1, −σ
2 exp(−3)
µφ2
]
E(TS) ≥ − 1
σ2
2φW [0,
−σ2 exp(−3)
µφ2
] (28)
W [−1, x], W [0, x] are the −1 and 0 branches of the Lambert W-function.
As above, a sufficiently large value of σ forces the upper and lower limits to
coalesce, causing T to collapse to zero. Figure 6 displays such coalescence with
increasing σ for the relation
−1
σ2
W [j,−σ2], j = −1, 0
Setting the two different expressions for W in Eq.(28) equal to each other
and solving for φ gives a stability condition in terms of σ and µ. The trick is
to recognize that W [−1,−x] = W [0,−x] at a branch point x = exp[−1]. The
stability condition for the inverse exposure index φ is then linear in σ:
φ >
σ exp[−1]√
µ
(29)
It is clearly necessary to make the same kind of expansion for φ as was done
for Γ in Section 4.1.
4.3 A second stress model
Next, we explore the interaction between T and φ using a version of the classic
‘vector borne infection’ formalism.
First, normalize variates as Tˆ ≡ T /Tmax, φˆ ≡ φ/φmax. The interaction
between them is then taken as (e.g., Bailey 1975)
dTˆ /dt = µ1φˆ(t)[1− Tˆ (t)]− γ1Tˆ (t)
dφˆ/dt = µ2Tˆ (t)[1− φˆ(t)]− γ2φˆ(t) (30)
The µi indicate positive feedback and the γi represent the rate of ‘entropy’
effects that decrease Tˆ and φˆ.
Elementary calculation finds nonequilibrium steady state values for this sys-
tem as
Tˆ → µ1µ2 − γ1γ2
µ2(µ1 + γ1)
φˆ→ µ1µ2 − γ1γ2
µ1(µ2 + γ2)
(31)
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Figure 6: Coalescence of stable and unstable nonequilibrium steady state modes
of −(1/σ2)W [i,−σ2], i = −1, 0 with increasing σ. If σ becomes sufficiently large,
regulation fails. The black line refers to the first expression of Eq.(28).
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Clearly, no nonequilibrium steady state is possible unless µ1µ2 > γ1γ2. That
is, the system collapses unless positive reinforcement effects are greater than
entropy effects, in this model.
A simplified stochastic variant of Eq.(30) can be made by fixing the value of
φ. Then
dTˆt = [µφ(1− Tˆt)− γTˆt]dt+ σTˆtdWt
= [µφ− (µφ+ γ)Tˆt]dt+ σTˆtdWt (32)
This has the expectation
E(Tˆ ) = µφ
µφ+ γ
(33)
Two points.
First, since this is an expectation, there will always be some probability that
the system falls below the critical value for Tˆ determined by the DRT.
Second, as γ rises, this probability significantly increases.
However, applying the Ito Chain Rule to Tˆ 2, after some calculation, finds
E(Tˆ 2) = [ µφ
µφ+ γ − σ2/2 ]
2 (34)
an expression that explodes if σ becomes large enough.
That is, the condition for stable variance in this model is
σ <
√
2(µφ+ γ)
φ >
1
µ
[
σ2
2
− γ] (35)
Rising σ can thus again trigger instability leading to rapid violation of the
DRT condition at a fixed value of φ, although the expression, involving stability
in variance, is qualitatively different from Eq.(29) and depends on the square of
σ.
These results appear to suggest that the overall modeling approach might
involve more general approximations of the form
φ >
m∑
k=0
ak(
σ√
µ
)k
for constants ak, k = 0, ...,m. Such series expansions may or may not have
closed functional form.
Clearly, using these methods, there can be no single, one-size-fits-all, ‘physics
envy’ format appropriate to all circumstances. These are regression-analog sta-
tistical models that must be fitted individually to data.
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5 Through the lens of symmetry-breaking
5.1 Basic ideas
An almost-classic phase transition model for less regular circumstances emerges
if it is possible to identify equivalence classes of a system’s developmental path-
ways, for example ‘healthy’ and ‘pathological’. This allows definition of a de-
velopmental symmetry groupoid for the developmental process (Wallace 2017;
Weinstein 1996; Golubitsky and Stewart 2006). A groupoid is a generalization
of an algebraic group in which a product is not necessarily defined between each
element. The simplest example is, perhaps, a disjoint union of separate symme-
try groups, but sets of equivalence classes also define a groupoid. See Wallace
(2012, 2015a, 2017) or Weinstein (1996) for details and the Mathematical Ap-
pendix for a summary.
Another ‘free energy’ can then be defined that is liable to an analog of
Landau’s classical spontaneous symmetry breaking, in the Morse Theory sense
(Pettini 2007; Matsumoto 2002). Under symmetry breaking, higher ‘temper-
atures’ are associated with more symmetric higher energy states in physical
systems. Cosmology makes much of such matters in the first moments after the
‘big bang’: different physical phenomena break out as the universe cools. Here,
for the control of cognitive processes, decline in T , φ, or M from Section 3 can
result in a sharply punctuated collapse from higher to lower symmetry states,
causing serious failures across a broad spectrum of control processes.
Again, following Atlan and Cohen (1998), a system is taken as cognitive if
it compares incoming signals with a learned or inherited picture of the world,
then actively chooses a response from a larger set of those possible to it. Choice
implies the existence of an information source, since it reduces uncertainty in
a formal manner. The basic model holds even in the absence of an internal
picture of the world.
Given a ‘dual’ information source associated with the inherently unstable
cognitive system of interest, an equivalence class algebra can be constructed
by choosing different system origin states and defining the equivalence of subse-
quent states at a later time by the existence of a high probability path connecting
them to the same origin state. Disjoint partition by equivalence classes, anal-
ogous to orbit equivalence classes in dynamical systems, defines a symmetry
groupoid associated with the cognitive process (Wallace 2017; Weinstein 1996;
Golubitsky and Stewart 2006).
The equivalence classes across possible origin states define a set of informa-
tion sources dual to different cognitive states available to the inherently unsta-
ble cognitive system or coalition of systems of interest. These create a large
groupoid, with each orbit corresponding to an elementary ‘transitive’ groupoid
whose disjoint union is the full groupoid. Each subgroupoid is associated with
its own dual information source, and larger groupoids must have richer dual
information sources than smaller.
Take XGi as the system’s dual information source associated with groupoid
element Gi. A Morse Function can now be built using an appropriate temper-
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ature analog.
Perhaps the most obvious such ‘temperature’ involves some positive, mono-
tonic increasing function of φ, T , the variables M , λ from Section 3, and |Ω|
from Section 2.3, i.e.,
Tˆ ≡ Tˆ (φ, T ,M, λ, |Ω|).
Recall, however, that negative λ necessarily implies a ‘pumped’ state requir-
ing high rates of M and may thus signal collapse in T with falling φ: these
parameters are not independent. As a consequence, determining the functional
form of Tˆ for a particular system may require detailed and difficult empirical or
observational study, particularly for rapidly-shifting global broadcast systems
characterized by the vector Ω.
The devil, as they say, is in the details.
Take H(XGi) ≡ HGi as the Shannon uncertainty of the information source
associated with the groupoid element Gi. It is possible to define another
Boltzmann-like probability as
P [HGi ] ≡
exp[−HGi/Tˆ ]∑
j exp[−HGj/Tˆ ]
(36)
The sum is over the different possible cognitive modes of the full system.
The ‘free energy’ Morse Function F is then defined as
exp[−F/Tˆ ] ≡
∑
j
exp[−HGj/Tˆ ]
F = −Tˆ log[
∑
j
exp[−HGj/Tˆ ]] (37)
Given the underlying groupoid generalized symmetries associated with high-
order cognition, as opposed to simple control theory, it is possible to apply a
version of Landau’s symmetry-breaking approach to phase transition (Pettini
2007). The shift between such symmetries should remain highly punctuated
in the ‘temperature’ Tˆ , but in the context of what are likely to be far more
complicated groupoid rather than group symmetries.
Arguing by abduction from physical theory, there should be only a few pos-
sible phases, with sharp and sudden transitions between them as Tˆ decreases.
5.2 Culture, pathology, and treatment
‘Culture’, the evolutionary anthropologist Robert Boyd asserts, ‘is as much a
part of human biology as the enamel on our teeth’. The symmetry-breaking
perspective can be extended to include the effects of an embedding cultural
environment – via an information source Z – on global broadcast mechanisms
at different scales and levels of organization. The dual information source XGi
then becomes a joint information source whose individual components are linked
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by crosstalk, having a joint source uncertainty H(XiG1 , X
j
G2 , ..., X
q
Gm). Given
the embedding cultural information source Z, then the splitting criterion be-
tween high and low probability developmental trajectories is given by network
information theory as the complicated sum
I(XiG1 , X
j
G2 , ..., X
q
Gm |Z) =
H(Z) +
∑
H(XjGn |Z)−H(XiG1 , XjG2 , ..., XqGm |Z) (38)
Eqs.(36) and (37) are then rewritten in terms of the splitting criterion
I((XiG1 , X
j
G2 , ..., X
q
Gm |Z).
We will call the new ‘free energy’ index – now influenced by embedding
culture – F .
We have, in essence, produced a kind of ‘Mathematical Kleinman Theory’,
representing in a formal way something of the observations of Kleinman (1991),
Kleinman and Cohen (1997), and their colleagues who have explored the pro-
found differences in the expression and experience of mental disorders across
cultures.
Indeed, Wallace et al. (2009, Section 6.2.4) examine the influence of culture
on malaria in the Fulani lands of West Africa, finding that former masters and
former slaves suffer markedly different disease phenotypes, presumably related
to the divergence in their cultural circumstances and historical trajectories.
It is possible to examine sufficient conditions for the intractable stability of
a pathological ‘ground state’ condensation representing control system collapse
via the Stochastic Stabilization Theorem (Appleby et al. 2008; Mao 2007) in a
particular embedding cultural milieu.
We assume a multidimensional vector of parameters associated with that
phase, J , that measures deviations from the pathological ground state. The free
energy measure from the generalization in Eq.(38) allows definition of another
‘entropy’ in terms of the Legendre transform
Sˆ ≡ F(J)− J · ∇JF (39)
Now we write another first-order ‘Onsager’ dynamic equation in the gradients
of Sˆ:
dJt = f(Jt, t)dt+ σ(Jt, t)dWt (40)
dWt is multi-dimensional white noise vector and σ(Jt, t) is a multidimen-
sional matrix function.
Again, f(Jt, t) is a first-order ‘diffusion’ equation in the gradients of Sˆ by J .
The base equation dX/dt = f(J, t), after some delay, under normal condi-
tions of recovery from a pathological state, will have a solution |J(t)| → ∞,
implying that there must be a transition to a more healthy stable but nonequi-
librium steady state. Recall that even a stable nonequilibrium state may remain
stable only so long as it is provided a sufficient rate of metabolic free energy.
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Successful organisms, species, and/or more complex colonial systems, all
have long-evolved remedial mechanisms akin to the immune system, cancer sup-
pression, wound healing, and suchlike.
However, the multidimensional version of the Stochastic Stabilization Theo-
rem (Appleby et al. 2008) ensures that, under very broad conditions, sufficient
noise – a big enough ‘symmetric’ form of the multidimensional noise matrix σ
– will drive |J(t)| logarithmically to zero, stabilizing the pathological mode in
spite of internal remedial efforts. Damage accumulation, aging, starvation and
so on come to mind.
Conversely, however, Appleby et al. (2008) also show that, for a system
of dimension ≥ 2, a noise matrix can always be found that destabilizes an
inherently stable system, i.e., one for which |Jt| → 0, in this context, a persistent
pathological condition for the organism or colony. That is, a ‘treatment’ can
be found that causes a transition to a different nonequilibrium steady state.
Iatrogenic intervention makes the individual sicker, proper treatment heals. In
many cases, of course, successful treatment is simply not realistic: ‘First, do no
harm’.
What should be evident from the previous section is that, for humans, culture
will be inherently convoluted not only with patterns of health and illness, but
with successful modalities of treatment (Wallace 2015b; Wallace et al. 2009,
Section 6.2; Kleinman 1991). Treatment, in the sense of Kleinman, will itself
be ‘culture-bound’.
For nonergodic systems, where time averages are not the same as ensemble
averages, the groupoid symmetries become ‘trivial’, associated with the indi-
vidual high probability paths for which an H-value may be defined, although
it cannot be represented in the form of the usual Shannon ‘entropy’ (Khinchin
1957, p. 72). Then equivalence classes must be defined in terms of other sim-
ilarity measures for different developmental pathways. The arguments of this
section regarding pathological modes and their treatment then follow through.
See Wallace (2018) for details.
6 Discussion and conclusions
A most characteristic marker of the living state is its dynamic cognition at
almost every scale and level of organization, from the subcellular to the socio-
cultural. For humans in particular, cognition at and across scales and levels
of organization is deeply embedded in a cultural milieu that affects even the
most basic modalities (e.g., Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005; Wallace 2007, 2015a).
Correct biocognitive function is particularly important during critical develop-
mental periods of an organism, and the failure of regulation of gene expression
causes a broad spectrum of serious developmental disorders.
Machine systems have yet to match either this cross-scale cognitive den-
sity, or the ubiquity of Barrs’ tunable global broadcast mechanism that recruits
underlying simpler cognitive modules into working coalitions, again at various
scales and levels of organization (Wallace 2012). Indeed, while cutting-edge com-
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puters can play the game of Go very well indeed, they cannot quickly switch
to chess, poker, playing with a cat, or driving home in rush-hour traffic, all of
which are within reach of a human Go master. Indeed, the Go master can do all
of these while his or her immune system is successfully fighting off some minor
infection and conducting routine cellular maintenance.
Cognition in living entities (and their social or sociocultural constructs or
artifacts) is necessarily as complex and dynamic as their embedding environ-
ments. Only since the middle of the last century have formal tools been available
that can address such complicated dynamics. The asymptotic limit theorems
of probability, and of information and control theories, permit construction of
empirical ‘regression models’ for biocognition and its dynamics. These models
may, as have their simpler analogs, become useful in the study and remediation
of cognitive failure at and across the scales, levels of organization, and dynamic
coalitions, that constitute and drive the phenomena of life.
Here, we have outlined the basic argument, and provided a number of exam-
ples of such ‘regression models’ that might be fitted to observational or experi-
mental data. Many more can, of course, be constructed from the essential formal
building blocks provided, and via the introduction of other such elements. One
particular interest has been the impact of environmental contamination and/or
psychosocial stress on biocognitive failure, in a large sense, affecting developmen-
tal trajectories across scale and organizational level. According to the model,
such factors can precipitate collapse to treatment-resistant pathological ‘ground
states’ across those scales and levels of organization, suggesting a basis for both
environmental disorders and for the ‘side effects’ of treatments addressing them.
Such matters are, of course, well-known in other vocabularies, but the analy-
sis here suggests a comprehensive and systematic approach to understanding
the impact of environment and of treatment-as-environment on developmental
disorders and their remediation.
We are led to suggest that, for humans, the central influences of culture
and its socioeconomic instantiations in developmental processes at all scales
and levels of organization suggests that virtually all developmental pathologies
must be viewed as fundamentally culture-bound. This has deep and obvious
implications for both individual treatment modalities and for large-scale public
health policies.
7 Mathematical appendix
7.1 The Black-Scholes model
Take H(Γ) as the control information rate ‘cost’ of stability at the index level
Γ. What is the mathematical form of H(Γ) under conditions of volatility i.e.,
variability in Γ proportional to it? Let
dΓt = g(t,Γt)dt+ bΓtdWt (41)
where dWt is taken as white noise and the function g(t,Γ) will ‘fall out’ of
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the calculation on the assumption of certain regularities outlined in Black and
Scholes (1973).
Let H(Γt, t) be the minimum needed incoming rate of control information
under the Data Rate Theorem, and expand in Γ using the Ito chain rule (Protter
1990)
dHt = [∂H/∂t+ g(Γt, t)∂H/∂Γ + 1
2
b2Γ2t∂
2H/∂Γ2]dt
+[bΓt∂H/∂Γ]dWt (42)
Define a quantity L as a Legendre transform of the rate H, by convention
having the form
L = −H+ Γ∂H/∂Γ (43)
Since H is an information index, it is a kind of free energy in the sense of
Feynman (2000) and L is a classic entropy measure.
Heuristically, replacing dX with ∆X in these expressions and applying
Eq.(42),
∆L = (−∂H/∂t− 1
2
b2Γ2∂2H/∂Γ2)∆t (44)
As in the classical Black-Scholes model (Black and Scholes 1973), the terms
in g and dWt ‘cancel out’, and the effects of noise are subsumed into the Ito
correction factor, a regularity assumption making this an exactly solvable but
highly approximate model.
The conventional Black-Scholes calculation takes ∆L/∆T ∝ L. Here, at
nonequilibrium steady state, we assume ∆L/∆t = ∂H/∂t = 0, so that
−1
2
b2Γ2∂2H/∂Γ2 = 0 (45)
By inspection,
H = κ1Γ + κ2 (46)
where the κi are nonnegative constants.
7.2 Groupoids
Given a pairing, connection by a meaningful path to the same basepoint, it is
possible to define ‘natural’ end-point maps α(g) = aj , β(g) = ak from the set
of morphisms G into the set A containing the ak, and a formally associative
product in the groupoid g1g2 provided α(g1g2) = α(g1), β(g1g2) = β(g2), and
β(g1) = α(g2). Then the product is defined, and associative, i.e., (g1g2)g3 =
g1(g2g3), with inverse defined by g = (aj , ak), g
−1 ≡ (ak, aj).
In addition there are natural left and right identity elements λg, ρg such that
λgg = g = gρg.
An orbit of the groupoid G over A is an equivalence class for the relation aj ∼
Gak if and only if there is a groupoid element g with α(g) = aj and β(g) = ak.
A groupoid is called transitive if it has just one orbit. The transitive groupoids
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are the building blocks of groupoids in that there is a natural decomposition
of the base space of a general groupoid into orbits. Over each orbit there is
a transitive groupoid, and the disjoint union of these transitive groupoids is
the original groupoid. Conversely, the disjoint union of groupoids is itself a
groupoid.
The isotropy group of a ∈ X consists of those g in G with α(g) = a = β(g).
These groups prove fundamental to classifying groupoids.
If G is any groupoid over A, the map (α, β) : G→ A×A is a morphism from
G to the pair groupoid of A. The image of (α, β) is the orbit equivalence relation
∼ G, and the functional kernel is the union of the isotropy groups. If f : X → Y
is a function, then the kernel of f , ker(f) = [(x1, x2) ∈ X ×X : f(x1) = f(x2)]
defines an equivalence relation.
Groupoids may have additional structure. As Weinstein (1996) explains,
a groupoid G is a topological groupoid over a base space X if G and X are
topological spaces and α, β and multiplication are continuous maps. A criticism
sometimes applied to groupoid theory is that their classification up to isomor-
phism is nothing other than the classification of equivalence relations via the
orbit equivalence relation and groups via the isotropy groups. The imposition
of a compatible topological structure produces a nontrivial interaction between
the two structures. Below we will introduce a metric structure on manifolds of
related information sources, producing such interaction.
In essence a groupoid is a category in which all morphisms have an inverse,
here defined in terms of connection by a meaningful path of an information
source dual to a cognitive process.
As Weinstein (1996) points out, the morphism (α, β) suggests another way
of looking at groupoids. A groupoid over A identifies not only which elements
of A are equivalent to one another (isomorphic), but it also parameterizes the
different ways (isomorphisms) in which two elements can be equivalent, i.e.,
all possible information sources dual to some cognitive process. Given the
information-theoretic characterization of cognition presented above, this pro-
duces a full modular cognitive network in a highly natural manner.
Brown (1987) describes the basic structure as follows:
A groupoid should be thought of as a group with many objects,
or with many identities... A groupoid with one object is essentially
just a group. So the notion of groupoid is an extension of that of
groups. It gives an additional convenience, flexibility and range of
applications...
EXAMPLE 1. A disjoint union [of groups] G = ∪λGλ, λ ∈ Λ, is
a groupoid: the product ab is defined if and only if a, b belong to the
same Gλ, and ab is then just the product in the group Gλ. There is
an identity 1λ for each λ ∈ Λ. The maps α, β coincide and map Gλ
to λ, λ ∈ Λ.
EXAMPLE 2. An equivalence relation R on [a set] X becomes
a groupoid with α, β : R → X the two projections, and product
(x, y)(y, z) = (x, z) whenever (x, y), (y, z) ∈ R. There is an identity,
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namely (x, x), for each x ∈ X...
Weinstein (1996) makes the following fundamental point:
Almost every interesting equivalence relation on a space B arises
in a natural way as the orbit equivalence relation of some groupoid
G over B. Instead of dealing directly with the orbit space B/G as
an object in the category Smap of sets and mappings, one should
consider instead the groupoid G itself as an object in the category
Ghtp of groupoids and homotopy classes of morphisms.
It is, in fact, possible to explore homotopy in paths generated by information
sources.
7.3 Morse Theory
Morse theory examines relations between analytic behavior of a function – the
location and character of its critical points – and the underlying topology of
the manifold on which the function is defined. We are interested in a number
of such functions, for example information source uncertainty on a parameter
space and ‘second order’ iterations involving parameter manifolds determining
critical behavior, for example sudden onset of a giant component in a network
model. We follow Pettini (2007).
The central argument of Morse theory is to examine an n-dimensional man-
ifold M as decomposed into level sets of some function f : M → R where R is
the set of real numbers. The a-level set of f is defined as
f−1(a) = {x ∈M : f(x) = a},
the set of all points in M with f(x) = a. If M is compact, then the whole
manifold can be decomposed into such slices in a canonical fashion between two
limits, defined by the minimum and maximum of f on M . Let the part of M
below a be defined as
Ma = f
−1(−∞, a] = {x ∈M : f(x) ≤ a}.
These sets describe the whole manifold as a varies between the minimum
and maximum of f .
Morse functions are defined as a particular set of smooth functions f : M →
R as follows. Suppose a function f has a critical point xc, so that the derivative
df(xc) = 0, with critical value f(xc). Then f is a Morse function if its critical
points are nondegenerate in the sense that the Hessian matrix J of second
derivatives at xc, whose elements, in terms of local coordinates are
Ji,j = ∂2f/∂xi∂xj ,
has rank n, which means that it has only nonzero eigenvalues, so that there are
no lines or surfaces of critical points and, ultimately, critical points are isolated.
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The index of the critical point is the number of negative eigenvalues of J at
xc.
A level set f−1(a) of f is called a critical level if a is a critical value of f ,
that is, if there is at least one critical point xc ∈ f−1(a).
Again following Pettini (2007), the essential results of Morse theory are as
follows:
1. If an interval [a, b] contains no critical values of f , then the
topology of f−1[a, v] does not change for any v ∈ (a, b]. Importantly,
the result is valid even if f is not a Morse function, but only a smooth
function.
2. If the interval [a, b] contains critical values, the topology of
f−1[a, v] changes in a manner determined by the properties of the
matrix J at the critical points.
3. If f : M → R is a Morse function, the set of all the critical
points of f is a discrete subset of M , i.e., critical points are isolated.
This is Sard’s Theorem.
4. If f : M → R is a Morse function, with M compact, then on
a finite interval [a, b] ⊂ R, there is only a finite number of critical
points p of f such that f(p) ∈ [a, b]. The set of critical values of f
is a discrete set of R.
5. For any differentiable manifold M , the set of Morse functions
on M is an open dense set in the set of real functions of M of
differentiability class r for 0 ≤ r ≤ ∞.
6. Some topological invariants of M , that is, quantities that are
the same for all the manifolds that have the same topology as M , can
be estimated and sometimes computed exactly once all the critical
points of f are known: let the Morse numbers µi(i = 0, ...,m) of a
function f on M be the number of critical points of f of index i,
(the number of negative eigenvalues of H). The Euler characteristic
of the complicated manifold M can be expressed as the alternating
sum of the Morse numbers of any Morse function on M ,
χ =
m∑
i=1
(−1)iµi.
The Euler characteristic reduces, in the case of a simple polyhe-
dron, to
χ = V − E + F
where V,E, and F are the numbers of vertices, edges, and faces in
the polyhedron.
7. Another important theorem states that, if the interval [a, b]
contains a critical value of f with a single critical point xc, then the
topology of the set Mb defined above differs from that of Ma in a
way which is determined by the index, i, of the critical point. Then
Mb is homeomorphic to the manifold obtained from attaching to Ma
an i-handle, i.e., the direct product of an i-disk and an (m− i)-disk.
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Matsumoto (2002) and Pettini (2007) provide details and further references.
8 Culturally-specific generalized inflammation
We summarize Wallace (2015b, Sec. 8.5), which is not widely available. The
stresses that activate cognitive modules and their shifting coalitions are not ran-
dom sequences of perturbations and not independent of culturally-modulated
perception. That is, stress responses involve highly correlated, grammatical,
syntactical processes by which an embedding psychosocial environment com-
municates with an individual’s cognitive physiological and mental hierarchy,
strongly structured by the power relations between groups. The stress expe-
rienced by an individual can thus be taken as another adiabatically piecewise
stationary ergodic (APSE) information source, interacting with a set of dual
information sources defined by cognition at different scales and levels of organi-
zation.
We now define stress by empirical observation, determining the concentra-
tions of HPA axis hormones and other biochemical signals according to an
appropriate natural time frame, taken as the inherent period of the system.
Under normal circumstances, i.e., in the absence of extraordinary meaningful
psychosocial stress, we measure a series of n biomarker concentrations at time t
represented as an n-dimensional vector Xt. We conduct numerous experiments
and/or observations, creating a regression model so that, in the absence of ex-
treme perturbation, and to first order, the concentration of biomarkers at time
t + 1 can be written in terms of that at time t using a matrix equation of the
form
Xt+1 ≈< R > Xt + b0 (47)
where < R > is a matrix of regression coefficients, b0 a vector of constant terms.
Under modest perturbation by a non-random, structured, stress,
Xt+1 = (< R > +δRt+1)Xt + b0
≡< R > Xt + t+1 (48)
where b0 and δRt+1Xt have been absorbed into a vector t+1 of ‘error terms’
that, importantly, are not necessarily small.
Recognize that this is not a population process whose continuous analog is
exponential growth. Rather this expression involves the passage of a signal,
structured psychosocial stress, through some physiological and/or mental filter
that can change the structure of that signal.
Taking the matrix of regression coefficients < R > as sufficiently regular, it
becomes possible to Jordan block diagonalize it using the matrix of its column
eigenvectors Q so that
QXt+1 = (Q < R > Q
−1)QXt +Qt+1 (49)
or,
Yt+1 =< J > Yt +Wt+1 (50)
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where Yt ≡ QXt,Wt+1 ≡ Qt+1, and < J >≡ Q < R > Q−1 is a block diagonal
matrix in terms of the eigenvalues of < R >.
Thus the rate-distorted writing of structured stress on the affected physio-
logical submodules through δRt+1 is reexpressed in terms of the vector Wt+1.
The sequence of Wt+1 is then the rate-distorted image of the information
source defined by the system of external structured psychosocial stress. This
formulation permits estimation of the nonequilibrium steady-state effects of that
image on underlying cognitive physiological and mental modules and dynamics.
Since everything is APSE, it becomes possible to either time or ensemble average
both sides of Eq.(50), so that the one-period offset is absorbed in the averaging,
giving a nonequilibrium steady state relation
< Y >=< J >< Y > + < W > (51)
equivalent to
< Y >= (I− < J >)−1 < W > (52)
where I is the n× n identity matrix.
It is now possible to reverse the argument, choosing Yk to be a fixed eigenvec-
tor of< R >. Expressing the diagonalization of< J > in terms of its eigenvalues
gives the average excitation of the generalized physiological stress response in
terms of an appropriate eigentransformed pattern of exciting perturbations as
< Yk >=
< Wk >
1− < λk > (53)
where < λk > is the eigenvalue of < Yk >, and < Wk > is a similarly appro-
priately transformed set of ongoing perturbations by structured psychosocial
stress.
In consequence, there will be a culturally characteristic form of perturbation
by structured psychosocial stress, by the Wk, that will resonantly excite a partic-
ular eigenmode of the generalized physiological stress response. Conversely, by
tuning the eigenmodes of < R > the generalized stress response can be trained
to galvanized excitation in the presence of particular forms of perturbation.
This is because, if < R > has been appropriately determined from regression
relations, then the λk will be a kind of multiple correlation coefficient (Wallace
and Wallace 2000) so that particular eigenpatterns of perturbation will have
greatly amplified impact on the generalized inflammatory response. If λ = 0
then perturbation has no more effect than its own magnitude. However, if
λ → 1, then the written image of a perturbing psychosocial stressor will have
very great impact. A system with λ ≈ 0 can be characterized as locally-resilient
since its response is no greater than the perturbation itself.
Learning by the cognitive physiological modules is, in this model, the process
of tuning response to perturbation. This is why we have written < R > instead
of simply R: the regression matrix is a tunable set of variables. The argument
could be greatly simplified by invoking the tuning theorem variant of the coding
theorem (Wallace 2015b, Sec. 1.1).
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